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IN THE MATTER OF ANONYMOUS, A MINOR:




According to the United States Supreme Court, states may require
that a pregnant minor obtain parental consent before terminating her
pregnancy, but only if the minor has the opportunity to seek a waiver, or
bypass, of that consent.1 The Supreme Court has further established that
a minor who requests such a waiver must be granted her request upon
successful demonstration that she is mature and sufficiently informed to
make a decision about abortion, or, even if not mature and informed, that
the abortion is nonetheless in her best interest.2
While Supreme Court precedent elaborates the general parameters
of parental involvement requirements, the practical meaning of these
mandates emerges in local arenas. The meaning of parental involvement
mandates takes shape, for example, when minors approach abortion
providers to obtain abortions, when trial courts respond to minors' peti-
tions to waive parental involvement, and when appellate courts are called
upon to further define the terms of the law. 3 The meaning of "mature
and informed" is a contested matter played out time and again in waiver
of parental consent hearings, and what counts as the "best interest" of a
pregnant minor is fashioned by trial court judges and state appellate
* Associate Professor, Department of Government and Law, Lafayette College. B.A.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1983; Ph.D., University of Washington, 1992. This article is
based, in considerable part, on information obtained during interviews with those familiar with
Alabama's parental consent requirement and accompanying judicial waiver proceedings. I am
much indebted to those who agreed to share with me their knowledge and experiences. I also
find myself, once again, in the debt of Wayne Fishman, whose conceptual and editorial input
contributed to this article. My appreciation extends as well to Steve Winnie and Michael
Tollini for their fine editorial work.
1 See Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 11), 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
2 Id. at 643-44.
3 Examinations of the implementation of parental involvement requirements frequently
note the Supreme Court's failure to provide guidance for determining when a judicial bypass
should be granted. See, e.g., Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a
Child's Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1889 (1996) (commenting that the
Court has given no direction as to how a child's maturity is to be ascertained); Anita J. Pliner
& Suzanne Yates, Psychological and Legal Issues in Minors' Rights to Abortion, 48 J. Soc.
ISSUES, at 203, 208 (1992) (noting that the Supreme Court and state legislatures have offered
judges little guidance for determining when a judicial bypass should be granted).
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courts that hear appeals of denied waivers. 4 Even with the oversight of
the appeals process, how trial judges conduct waiver hearings is, within
certain broadly defined boundaries, a matter of substantial discretion. 5
Indeed, consider the following events that unfolded in 1998 in an
Alabama juvenile court. 6 A pregnant minor petitioned the juvenile court
for a bypass of parental consent and, in accordance with the state's man-
date, the court appointed an attorney to represent her. In an unusual
move, the trial court judge appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the
interests of the unborn fetus and permitted the guardian to cross-examine
the minor at the waiver hearing.7 The guardian ad litem questioned the
minor about her familiarity with certain Bible scriptures and asked
whether she was aware that, by choosing abortion, she would be "snuf-
fing out" the life of her own child.8 The guardian called witnesses from
pro-life organizations to testify on behalf of the fetus. The hearing lasted
nearly four hours. 9
Whether foreseen by the Supreme Court when it handed down the
basic guidelines of parental consent mandates, and whether such a move
will ultimately withstand constitutional scrutiny, trial court judges in Al-
abama presently have the option to appoint guardians ad litem for the
fetus. 0 Although this maneuver has yet to achieve widespread popular-
ity, in Alabama's fourth largest county, two of the three juvenile court
judges routinely designate such guardians in waiver hearings. As a re-
sult, the option to appoint guardians is an added component of Ala-
bama's parental involvement law.
Because of the change in the conduct of waiver hearings that ac-
companies these appointments, and because this approach to waiver
hearings is likely to gain momentum,"I it is worth considering whether
guardianship appointments-both generally and as applied in Ala-
bama-would withstand constitutional challenge. This paper argues that
the appointment of guardians to represent the unborn transforms waiver
hearings into adversarial proceedings, thereby increasing the burden a
4 See, e.g., Helena Silverstein, The View from the Bench: Judging Parental Consent
Bypass Requests in Alabama (March 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (ex-
plaining how Alabama appellate courts have elaborated standards for determining maturity and
best interests, and how trial courts often construct their own standards during waiver hearings).
5 See, e.g., Suellyn Scarnecchia & Julie Kunce Field, Judging Girls: Decision Making
in Parental Consent to Abortion Cases, 3 MIcH. J. GENDER & L. 75, 113 (1995) (arguing that,
because trial judges in Michigan have little guidance on how to conduct bypass hearings, their
actions are clearly discretionary).
6 See In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998); see also infra Part II.A.
7 Id.
8 See Amy Bach, No Choice for Teens, THE NATION, Oct. 11, 1999, at 7.
9 Id.
10 See infra Part II.B.
I See infra Part lI.D.
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minor confronts when seeking an abortion. In addition, guardian ap-
pointments are, at bottom, moral regulations that advance a particular
view about the nature of human life and personhood. However, despite
these shortcomings, guardianship appointments are consistent with fed-
eral precedent. Although the use of guardians in Alabama juvenile court-
rooms does raise some constitutional questions, because Planned
Parenthood v. Casey12 allows states to encourage childbirth over abor-
tion, designating guardians to represent fetuses turns out to be a constitu-
tionally permissible regulation of a woman's abortion rights. Finally,
this paper contends that the inadequacy of standing precedent on abortion
is evidenced by the fact that guardianship appointments are likely to pass
constitutional muster.
Part I of this paper reviews the constitutional status of parental in-
volvement requirements. Part II examines the use of guardians ad litem
in one Alabama juvenile court and the associated Alabama case law.
Part III suggests that while guardianship appointments intrude on a wo-
man's right to choose abortion, they are nonetheless permissible given
that Planned Parenthood v. Casey permits states to encourage childbirth
over abortion. Part IV concludes by pointing to the substantial shortcom-
ings of Casey made evident by the case of guardianship appointments..
I. PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT STATUTES AND
LEGAL PRECEDENT
Parental involvement requirements are among the many abortion
regulations states have instituted since Roe v. Wade13 held that abortion
is a constitutionally protected right. 14 Parental involvement legislation
takes one of two forms: parental consent or parental notification. Some
states prohibit physicians from performing abortions on minors without
parental consent,15 while others direct physicians to notify one or both
parents before performing an abortion.' 6 Currently, 17 states require pa-
12 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
'3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14 For instance, states have imposed such things as informed consent requirements and
mandatory waiting periods for adult women seeking abortions. For an overview of legislative
regulations of abortion since Roe, see, e.g., Kenneth J. Meier et al., The Impact of State-level
Restrictions on Abortion, 33 DEMOGRAPHY 307 (1996); MARY C. SEGERS & TIMOTHY A.
BYRNES, ABORTION POLITICS IN AMERICAN STATES (1995); BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG &
DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1993).
15 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (West 2000) (requiring the consent of one
parent); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-51 to 41-41-63 (1999) (requiring the consent of both
parents).
16 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (Anderson 1999) (requiring the notifica-
tion of one parent); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 1998) (requiring the notification of
both parents).
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rental consent in a minor's decision to choose abortion,' 7 15 mandate
parental notification, 18 and another 10 have passed parental involvement
bills that remain unenforced. 19
Typically, statutes requiring parental involvement include excep-
tions. For instance, in most states an emancipated minor can obtain an
abortion without informing her parents. 20 In addition, states include ex-
ceptions for "medical emergencies." 2' Some states specify that parental
involvement is not required in instances of reported child abuse or
neglect. 22
Statutes vary across states in a number of ways. In most states, the
consent or notification of one parent is sufficient. In a few states, the
involvement of both parents is required,23 although exceptions are often
included for separated parents.24 Some states require a waiting period
between the time that a parent is notified and the abortion. 25
Most states have conformed their statutory language to the language
of Supreme Court rulings on parental involvement. Although initially
17 These are Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Parental Involvement in Minors' Abortions, in
STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF I (The Alan Guttmacher Institute, Nov. 1, 2001), at http://www.agi-
usa.org/pubs/spibPIMA.pdf (last visited December 16, 2001). In addition to these seventeen
states, Maine allows minors to receive counseling instead of obtaining parental consent or
court authorization for abortion. See id.
18 These are Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. Al-
though Oklahoma is listed among the states requiring parental notification, that state's law
does not, strictly speaking, mandate such notice. Instead, the law states: "Any person who
performs an abortion on a minor without parental consent or knowledge shall be liable for the
cost of any subsequent medical treatment such minor might require because of the abortion."
Id.
19 These are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, and New Mexico. Some of these statutes have been found constitutionally infirm;
others are currently under challenge. Id. In addition to these ten states, Ohio's parental con-
sent legislation has also been enjoined, but the state's parental notification law is currently
enforced. Id.
20 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(a) (West 2000).
21 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343, Subd. 4 (West 1998) (waiving required notifi-
cation when "the attending physician certifies in the pregnant woman's medical record that the
abortion is necessary to prevent the woman's death and there is insufficient time to provide the
required notice").
22 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-805 (Lexis 2000).
23 Arkansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Utah require the involvement of
both parents. See STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, supra note 17.
24 Mississippi mandates two-parent consent, but allows for exceptions when parents are
separated. See Miss. CODE. ANN. § 41-41-53(2) (West 1999). In contrast, Minnesota requires
two-parent notification, but does not provide an exception when the parents of the minor are
separated. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 1998).
25 The Minnesota statute prohibits abortions until 48 hours after the minor's parents have
been notified. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 1998).
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held unconstitutional, 26 the Supreme Court has affirmed state mandated
parental involvement in a line of more recent cases. 27 However, with
respect to parental consent, the Supreme Court has invalidated statutes
that do not include a bypass alternative. 28
The Supreme Court's logic in upholding only those parental consent
statutes that incorporate a bypass option rests on the view that minors
have a constitutionally protected right to abortion.
Indeed, considering her probable education, employment
skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, un-
wanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome
for a minor'. . . .Thus, the constitutional protection
against unjustified state intrusion into the process of de-
ciding whether or not to bear a child extends to pregnant
minors as well as adult women.29
While not providing the same level of protection for teens as for
adult women, the Court has held that a pregnant minor's right to abortion
may be regulated only when the state's interest in doing so is signifi-
cant. 30 In addition, regulation of abortion may not impose an "undue
burden" on a woman. 31 "A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for
the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus."'32
26 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down a Missouri
parental consent statute on the grounds that it gave parents a veto over the minor's abortion
decision).
. 27 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding Penn-
sylvania's one-parent consent requirement with a judicial bypass option); Hodgson v. Minne-
sota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (upholding Minnesota's two-parent notification requirement with a
judicial bypass option); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron 11), 497 U.S. 502 (1990)
(upholding Ohio's one-parent notification requirement with a judicial bypass option).
28 See, e.g., Bellotti 1, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (invalidating a Massachusetts law that al-
lowed minors to seek a judicial bypass of parental consent but only after first being denied
such consent). All parental involvement mandates currently in effect, except those in Utah and
Maryland, include a judicial bypass option. Utah requires that physicians notify the minor's
parents "if possible." UTAH CODE ANN. 76-7-304 (Lexis 1999). The Supreme Court upheld
this statute as applied in the case of an immature minor. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398
(1981). Maryland requires parental notification, but physicians may waive notice upon finding
that the notice to a parent would lead to abuse, that the minor is mature, or that notification
would not be in her best interests. MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II § 20-103 (2000).
29 Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 434-35 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at
642).
30 Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron 1), 462 U.S. 416, 427 n.10 (1983)
(noting that "the Court repeatedly has recognized that, in view of the unique status of children
under the law, the States have a 'significant' interest in certain abortion regulations aimed at
protecting children 'that is not present in the case of an adult'") (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at
75).
31 Casey, 505 U.S. at 874-75.
32 Id. at 877. For further explanation of the undue burden standard, see infra Part I.A.
2001]
74 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
Proceeding with these established standards, the Court has held that
states do have a significant interest in encouraging parental involvement
when a minor seeks an abortion. Members of the Court have commented
that, "[t]he State has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its
young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment
may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely. '33 In
addition, the state has an interest in protecting the right of parents to
guide the lives of their children and advancing the "family unit."'34
"[T]he guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies
limitations on the freedoms of minors." 35
While finding a state interest justifying parental consultation, the
Court has overturned statutes when they impose an undue burden on mi-
nors. Most important in this regard, the Court has ruled that mandated
parental consent, when not accompanied by an alternative for the avoid-
ance of that consent, amounts to a "parental veto" over a minor's abor-
tion decision. As stated in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, the Court's
first ruling on parental consent, a state "does not have the constitutional
authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto"
over a woman's abortion decision. 36 However, in a ruling handed down
on the same day as Danforth, the Court suggested that a statute prefer-
ring parental involvement, but permitting the mature and informed minor
to obtain an abortion without parental consultation, would be "fundamen-
tally different from a statute that creates a 'parental veto.' 37
In Bellotti v. Baird II (hereinafter "Bellotti II"), the Court outlined a
method for creating a constitutionally sound parental consent require-
ment. The Massachusetts statute under consideration in Bellotti II incor-
porated a judicial bypass procedure as part of its parental consent
mandate. Overturning the statute, the Court noted that, even though the
law included a bypass option, the minor could only exercise that option
33 Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
34 Id.
35 Belloti I, 443 U.S. at 637. Furthermore, "the family has a privacy interest in the
upbringing and education of children and the intimacies of the marital relationship which is
protected by the Constitution against undue state interference." Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 446
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
36 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
37 Bellotti v. Baird 1, 428 U.S. 132, 145 (1976). In this case, the Court vacated the lower
court judgment that enjoined enforcement of a Massachusetts parental consent statute and re-
manded the case for certification of relevant issues of state law to the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts. The Court commented that
[t]he picture thus painted by the respective appellants is of a statute that prefers
parental consultation and consent, but that permits a mature minor capable of giving
informed consent to obtain, without undue burden, an order permitting the abortion
without parental consultation ... The statute, as thus read, would be fundamentally
different from a statute that creates a 'parental veto.'
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after her parents refused to consent to the abortion. Finding fault with
this arrangement, the Court stated that "every minor must have the op-
portunity-if she so desires-to go directly to a court without first con-
sulting or notifying her parents. ' 38 Furthermore, the Court established
guidelines that would save parental consent statutes from constitutional
infirmity. A pregnant minor, seeking a waiver of mandated parental con-
sent, is entitled
to show either: (1) that she is mature enough and well
enough informed to make her abortion decision, in con-
sultation with her physician, independently of her par-
ents' wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make
this decision independently, the desired abortion would
be in her best interests. The proceeding in which this
showing is made must assure that a resolution of the is-
sue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed
with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an
effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained. In
sum, the procedure must ensure that the provision re-
quiring parental consent does not in fact amount to the
'absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto' that was found
impermissible in Danforth. 39
Although this procedure was initially elaborated as dictum, many
states have followed the Court's lead when crafting parental consent and
notification statutes. Bellotti II has thus functioned as a guide for legisla-
tive construction of bypass provisions. Significantly, since its ruling in
Bellotti II, the Court has upheld all but one parental involvement
statute.40
Bellotti II, though, is hardly the end of the story. For example, al-
though Bellotti H clearly states that parental consent statutes must be
accompanied by some type of bypass alternative, the Court has yet to
decide whether the same is true of parental notification laws.4' In fact,
the Court has declined the opportunity to so rule, explicitly stating that it
38 Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 647.
39 Id. at 643-44.
40 The one regulation overturned by the Court was an Ohio regulation. See Akron 1, 462
U.S. at 440 (invalidating a blanket parental consent requirement for all minors under 15 years
of age).
41 The Court has commented that mandated notification does not appear to impose the
same types of obstacles as mandated consent. See, e.g., Matheson, 450 U.S. at 409 (noting that
mandated consent demands parental approval and could amount to a veto, whereas under a
"mere requirement of parental notice," a minor may still obtain her abortion even without
parental approval).
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would leave for another day a determination of whether mandated notifi-
cation must contain a bypass alternative. 42
In addition, while Bellotti II establishes two criteria upon which mi-
nors can seek a waiver of parental consent-the "mature and informed
minor" standard and the "best interests" standard-neither that case nor
any other Supreme Court ruling clearly defines these criteria.43 Trial
court judges thus have substantial discretion when deciding whether and
under what conditions to grant a bypass request. Owing to the confiden-
tial nature of bypass hearings and records, the discretionary power of
trial judges is particularly insulated from oversight and scrutiny.
Finally, some parental involvement laws incorporate provisions ei-
ther allowing for or mandating the appointment of a guardian ad litem to
protect the interests of the minor;" not included, though, are provisions
pertaining to the appointment of guardians to protect the interests of the
unborn. Nonetheless, and as detailed below, some judges have appointed
guardians to represent the unborn during waiver hearings. 45 The oppor-
tunity to consider such appointments has yet to present itself to the Su-
preme Court. Thus, whether guardianship appointments 46 pose
constitutional problems remains an open question. 47
42 See Akron 11, 497 U.S. at 510 ("[A]lthough our cases have required bypass procedures
for parental consent statutes, we have not decided whether parental notice statutes must con-
tain such procedures. We leave the question open, because, whether or not the Fourteenth
Amendment requires notice statutes to contain bypass procedures, [Ohio] H.B. 319's bypass
procedure meets the requirements identified for parental consent statutes in Danforth, Bellotti,
Ashcroft, and Akron.") (citations omitted).
43 Bellotti Ii gives some guidance upon which lower courts have drawn. "[T]he peculiar
nature of the abortion decision requires the opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the
maturity of pregnant minors." 443 U.S. at 643-44 n.23. In addition, the Court states that, "an
abortion may not be the best choice for the minor. The circumstances in which the issue arises
will vary widely. In a given case, alternatives to abortion, such as marriage to the father of the
child, arranging for its adoption, or assuming the responsibilities of motherhood with the as-
sured support of family, may be feasible and relevant to the minor's best interests." Id. at
642-43. Despite these statements, commentators frequently note the absence of guidelines for
determining maturity and best interests. See supra note 3.
44 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343, Subd. 6 (West 1998) (stating that a pregnant
minor petitioning to waive parental notification "may participate in proceedings in the court on
her own behalf, and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for her. The court shall, how-
ever, advise her that she has a right to court appointed counsel, and shall, upon her request,
provide her with such counsel").
45 See infra Part II.
46 Unless otherwise noted, "guardian ad litem" or "guardianship appointments" refers to
those guardians designated to represent the fetus.
47 While the Supreme Court has not dealt with guardianship appointments, some state
courts have. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497 (Ala. 1998) (per curiam) (invalidat-
ing a guardian's appeal of the granting of a waiver petition without addressing the general
propriety of guardianship appointments); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 1989) (find-
ing that "the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the fetus was clearly improper").
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II. THE ALABAMA PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE AND THE
CASE OF GUARDIANS AD LITEM 48
Mirroring the outline put forward in Bellotti II, Alabama enacted its
parental involvement mandate in June 1987. 49 In setting forth a one-
parent consent requirement for unemancipated minors under 18 years of
age, the Alabama statute provides the conditions for a waiver of that
consent. Specifically, if the minor elects not to or cannot obtain parental
consent for an abortion, she may petition the juvenile court or a court of
equal standing for a waiver of the consent requirement.50 Consent "shall
be waived if the court finds either: (1) That the minor is mature and well-
informed enough to make the abortion decision on her own; or (2) That
performance of the abortion would be in the best interest of the minor. 51
Consistent with Bellotti II, the Act stipulates that the waiver proceeding
be confidential. 52 In addition, "court proceedings shall be given such
precedence over other pending matters as is necessary to insure that the
court may reach a decision promptly, but in no case, except as provided
herein, shall the court fail to rule within 72 hours of the time the petition
is filed, Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays excluded. '53
Beyond the parameters established in Bellotti II, the Alabama stat-
ute provides that the court shall advise a minor seeking to waive consent
that she has a right to counsel and will be provided with an attorney if
she is unable to pay for one on her own. 54 In addition, a court con-
ducting waiver proceedings "shall issue written and specific factual find-
48 The following discussion of waiver hearings and the use of guardians ad litem is
based, in part, on interviews I conducted with those who have firsthand experience with the
process (full text of interview notes on file with author). Because waiver hearings are closed
and confidential, there is little publicly available information that offers insight into the
conduct of these hearings. Information that is publicly available derives largely from appellate
court decisions. These decisions typically indicate the basic facts of the case and the grounds
for the trial court's denial. However, appellate court decisions leave much unrevealed.
Therefore, between March and July 2001, I interviewed 28 people in Alabama who are
familiar with waiver hearings. The interviews were designed to elicit a wide range of
information on the conduct of waiver hearings, including, for example, the nature of the
questions posed to the minors, the role played by judges, attorneys, and witnesses, the
frequency of grants and denials, and the perceived fairness of the hearings. The interviews
were open-ended phone interviews that lasted, on average, about 45 minutes. Those
interviewed include court personnel, attorneys representing minors, attorneys appointed to
represent the unborn, and abortion providers. In the discussion that follows, I do not identify
the names of those interviewed, except where the participants have consented to my inclusion
of their names.
49 See 1987 Ala. Acts 87-286.
50 ALA. CODE § 26-21-3(e) (Michie 1992). The minor may petition the court in the
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ings and legal conclusions supporting its decision and shall order that a
confidential record of the evidence be maintained for at least four
years. '55 Finally, the statute specifies the terms for appealing the out-
come of a waiver hearing: an "expedited confidential and anonymous
appeal shall be available to any minor to whom the court denies a waiver
of consent. If notice of appeal is given, the record of appeal shall be
completed and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the
filing of the notice of appeal."'56 Among the things not specified is
whether a guardian ad litem may be appointed to represent the interests
of the minor57 or the fetus.
The Alabama parental consent provision took effect on September
23, 1987, three months after its enactment. 58 Just two weeks later, the
Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama handed down its first ruling in an
appeal of a trial court's decision to deny a waiver of consent. 59 Between
October 1987 and July 2001, the Court of Civil Appeals handed down at
least 34 rulings in cases involving petitions to waive parental consent.60
The Supreme Court of Alabama handed down another 11 rulings in
waiver cases. 61
These appellate decisions have elaborated some of the parameters
for determining when courts should grant waiver requests. 62 In addition,
the courts in some of Alabama's largest counties (e.g., Jefferson, Mont-
gomery, and Mobile) have putthe law into effect by establishing routine
procedures for handling waiver petitions. Generally speaking, minors
who wish to avoid parental involvement in their abortion decisions are
advised by abortion providers to contact the intake officer at the juvenile
or family court of their home county or the county in which the abortion
is to be performed. In those counties prepared to handle waiver peti-
tions, 63 the intake officer assigns the minor an attorney. In some coun-
55 § 26-21-4(g).
56 § 26-21-4(h).
57 Although the statute is silent on this point, the Alabama Supreme Court has held "that
the attorney to be appointed under the parental consent act is to be a guardian ad litem, and
that future appointments should be so designated and shall entail the responsibilities attendant
to such appointments." Ex parte Anonymous, 531 So. 2d 901, 905 (Ala. 1988).
58 See In re Anonymous, 515 So. 2d 1254, 1254 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987).
59 See id.
60 See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 549 So. 2d 1347 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989); In re Anony-
mous, 515 So. 2d 1254 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987); In re Anonymous, 531 So. 2d 895 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1988).
61 See, e.g., Ex parte Anonymous, 597 So. 2d 711 (Ala. 1992); Ex parte Anonymous,
595 So. 2d 499 (Ala. 1992); Ex parte Anonymous, 531 So. 2d 901, 905 (Ala. 1988).
62 Except as otherwise noted, this discussion of waiver procedures is drawn from infor-
mation obtained during interviews. Interview notes supra note 48. See also Silverstein, supra
note 4.
63 Interviews with those involved in waiver proceedings indicate that some minors have
petitioned for waivers in the larger counties after discovering that the courts in their home
counties have no procedures in place to handle waiver requests. This would be consistent with
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ties these are legal aid attorneys; in other counties there is a list of
attorneys who have agreed to handle waiver requests. After meeting
with her attorney, the minor appears before a judge in a confidential
waiver hearing. According to most accounts, the average hearing takes
less than 30 minutes. 64 Usually only the minor offers testimony, al-
though on occasion the minor's legal counsel calls a friend or relative of
the minor to testify on her behalf. After the hearing, and within the spec-
ified timeframe required by the Alabama Code,65 the judge issues a writ-
ten order either granting or denying the waiver request. If granted, the
minor can then proceed with an abortion absent her parents' involve-
ment.66 If denied, the minor may file an expedited appeal. 67
A. THE ORIGINS OF GUARDIANSHIP APPOINTMENTS IN ALABAMA 6 8
On July 6, 1998, a pregnant minor, three months shy of her eight-
eenth birthday, sought a waiver of parental consent from the juvenile
court in Montgomery County.69 Her petition to waive consent was as-
signed to Judge W. Mark Anderson, one of three judges responsible for
reviewing waiver petitions in Montgomery. Based on routine procedures
established by the courthouse, the court intake officer assigned Beverly
Howard as counsel for the minor.70 Going beyond established proce-
dures, Anderson appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the interests
of the fetus.71 Rather than choosing from the typical list of attorneys
who represent juveniles at the Montgomery Juvenile Court, Anderson
appointed Julian McPhillips, a locally well-known pro-life attorney who
had represented abortion protesters in previous cases. 72
Attorneys rarely file motions in advance of waiver hearings. But
when Beverly Howard received notice of the appearance of "Baby
Ashley," she filed two motions. Howard moved to strike the appointment
research findings demonstrating that in Pennsylvania two-thirds of the county courts are not
prepared to handle judicial bypass inquiries. See Helena Silverstein, Road Closed: Evaluating
the Judicial Bypass Provision of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, 24 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 73, 79-88 (1999).
64 Interview notes supra note 48.
65 Supra note 53 and accompanying text.
66 The order is typically limited to the particular county where the minor plans to obtain
the abortion.
67 Supra note 56 and accompanying text.
68 Except as otherwise noted, this discussion of guardianship appointments in Alabama is
drawn from information obtained during interviews. Interview notes supra note 48.
69 In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d at 499. The ruling does not specify that the minor
sought the waiver in Montgomery County.
70 Howard's name was among those of several attorneys who regularly represented mi-
nors. Interview notes supra note 48.
71 See CARROLL DALE SHORT, THE PEOPLE'S LAWYER: THE COLORFUL LIFE AND TIMES
OF JULIAN L. McPHILLIPS, JR. 305-27 (2000); Bach, supra note 8, at 7.
72 SHORT, supra note 71, at 325-27.
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of the guardian for the fetus and also requested that Anderson recuse
himself from the case. 73
Anderson denied the motion to strike the guardian and explained the
legal authority for his decision. Lacking authority under the parental
consent statute to appoint such a guardian, Anderson turned to Rule 17(c)
of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. According to Rule 17(c),
"[w]hen the interest of an infant unborn or unconceived is before the
court, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for such interest. '74 To
justify his use of Rule 17(c), Anderson noted the importance of giving
the "unborn child" an "opportunity to have a voice, even a vicarious one,
in the decision making. 75
Howard based the second motion requesting recusal on an earlier
waiver case heard by Anderson. In that case, the judge granted the mi-
nor's waiver request, but only after writing a lengthy judicial order that
expressed, among other things, his "fixed opinion that abortion is
wrong."'76 According to the order, the minor's decision to proceed with
the abortion would compound one mistake with another more terrible
one, namely, the death of her unborn child. Still, Anderson waived pa-
rental consent upon finding that the minor was sufficiently mature and
informed to have the abortion, and upon concluding that, given the ma-
turity finding, the law allows the judge no alternative but to grant the
waiver. The order noted that the minor would turn 18 in a month and
could wait until then to have the abortion without a judicial waiver. But,
quoting from Shakespeare and referring to Macbeth's plan to assassinate
his own father, the judge wrote,
If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well It were
done quickly. If th' assassination Could trammel up the
consequence, and catch With his surcease success: that
but this blow Might be the be-all and the end-all-here,
But here, upon this bank and shoal of time. We'd jump
the life to come. But in these cases We still have judg-
ment here; that we but teach Bloody instructions, which
being taught, return To plague th' inventor. This even-
handed justice Commends th' ingredients of our
poison'd chalice To our own lips.' 77
Concluding the order, Anderson wrote, "Judgment is the Lord and is
eternal, yet his forgiveness and mercy are limitless. 78
73 Interview notes supra note 48.
74 ALA. R. Ov. P. 17(c).
75 Bach, supra note 8, at 7.
76 Id.
77 Interview notes supra note 48.
78 Id.
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Anderson denied the motion to recuse, stating that the grant of the
judicial waiver in that earlier case contradicted Howard's conclusion that
his views about abortion might problematically interfere with his ability
to follow the law.79
After Anderson denied the motions, the waiver hearing went for-
ward. McPhillips used his position as guardian ad litem to summon wit-
nesses on behalf of the fetus. A physician testified on the physical
development of the fetus.80 McPhillips also called the executive director
of Sav-A-Life, a nondenominational Christian ministry that opposes
abortion and encourages women to consider alternatives to ending their
pregnancies. 8' McPhillips questioned these witnesses over the continu-
ous objections of the minor's legal counsel.82
McPhillips sought to elicit testimony establishing that the fetus is a
human life with an interest in being born. In a televised interview after
the case, McPhillips stated, "What I'm saying is that an unborn child is at
stake, here. A heart that's beating at four weeks, brain waves that are
very strong at six to seven weeks. At eight weeks you've got all the
organs in place, and the rate of maturation is terrific. ' 83 It is precisely
this type of information that McPhillips put on the record by calling a
physician. In addition, Sav-A-Life's executive director testified about
her experiences with post-abortive women. 84
McPhillips also questioned the minor at length. At one point he
asked the minor whether she was familiar with a quote in which God
says to the prophet Jeremiah: "Before I formed you in the womb I knew
you."'85 In addition to quoting Bible scripture over the objections of the
minor's counsel, he asked the young woman whether she was aware that
the "baby" already had a heart beat and questioned whether she minded
"killing" her baby. Specifically, after the minor indicated that she be-
lieved abortion to be a sin, McPhillips asked her the following: "You say
that you are aware that God instructed you not to kill your own baby, but
you want to do it anyway? And are you saying here today that notwith-
standing everything that you want to interfere with God's plan for your
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 "Say-A-Life is a non-denominational Christian ministry which offers positive alterna-
tives to abortion through confidential counseling." http://www.members.tripod.com-savalife/
(last visited Dec. 1, 2001). According to one account, the organization "provides counseling
for pregnant girls and women who are considering an abortion. The counselors' purpose is to
urge them instead to put their babies up for adoption, and they pave the way with referrals to
adoption agencies." SHORT, supra note 71, at 306.
82 Interview notes supra note 48.
83 SHORT, supra note 71, at 319.
84 Interview notes supra note 48.
85 See Interview notes supra note 48 (quoting Jeremiah 1:5).
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baby?"86 McPhillips further asked: "Here you have the chance to save
the life of your own baby .... And still you want to go ahead and snuff
out the life of your own baby?" 87
McPhillips' use of the term "kill" prompted an objection by the pe-
titioner's counsel.8 8 In response, McPhillips explained, "I didn't say
'murder,' although it's murder."'89 This provoked another objection from
Howard, who argued that waiver hearings do not extend the right to kill
but rather determine whether a minor is in a position to make a decision
about abortion without parental consent.90 In an effort to make the ques-
tioning "more palatable," Anderson suggested that the parties refer to the
procedure as "cooperating in terminating the life of her unborn child." 91
For her part, Howard questioned the minor in order to elicit testi-
mony to demonstrate that the minor would meet both prongs of the
waiver requirement. In such hearings it is typical for minors to be ques-
tioned about their age, level of education, grades, future plans, career
interests, and marital status. 92 Responses to these questions speak to the
minor's level of maturity. In order to determine whether the minor is
sufficiently informed to proceed with the abortion, attorneys commonly
pose questions about the medical aspects of the abortion procedure and
its risks. Attorneys also ask minors whether they have considered alter-
natives to abortion and what plans they have made to handle any physical
or emotional consequences associated with the abortion. Finally, to de-
termine whether the abortion is in the minor's best interests, the attorney
asks the minor why she would choose abortion over other alternatives
and why she would make such a choice without involving her parents.93
In this case, Howard's questioning revealed that the minor had ob-
tained a scholarship for college, claimed her mother would not support
her financially should she have a child, and received counseling from
Sav-A-Life about the alternatives to abortion.94 The minor further testi-
fied about the risks of abortion and expressed her view that proceeding
with childbirth would interfere with her ability to pursue college. Fi-
nally, the petitioner expressed fears about her father discovering her
86 Bach, supra note 8, at 7.
87 Id.




92 Interviews with several attorneys who have represented minors in Alabama indicate
that these are the types of questions posed during waiver hearings. Interview notes, supra note
48.
93 Id.
94 Bach, supra note 8, at 7.
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pregnancy, explaining that he "had been known to point a gun at boys
who looked at her provocatively. '95
Although waiver hearings in Alabama and elsewhere ordinarily take
less than 30 minutes, this hearing lasted nearly four hours96 and produced
approximately 150 transcript pages. 97 In the end, Anderson granted the
waiver, indicating that while he did "not condone abortion," he felt "con-
fined to the issue of waiver of parental consent" pursuant to state law. 98
Explaining his decision, Anderson's order reads,
From the record made through almost 4 hours of testi-
mony and arguments of the most acrimonious nature, it
is clear to the court that a waiver is not in the best inter-
est of this young woman. It certainly is not in the best
interest of the unborn child. Those findings are abun-
dantly clear from the efforts and evidence of Mr.
McPhillips. But unfortunately those two findings are not
determinative of the issue raised by this proceeding.
This court is bound to uphold the law, however distaste-
ful that may be and regardless of whether the law is con-
sistent with the court's fixed opinions.99
In addition, Anderson's order praises the performance of the guard-
ian ad litem, stating that McPhillips had done "a yeoman's job of protect-
ing the interests of his ward, to the extent that this unfortunate law
allows."' ° The order further expresses Anderson's views about abortion
in the following passage: "What we call life is but a brief passage in
eternity. There must be a special providence for the unborn who not only
are deprived of the opportunity to live but of the opportunity of having a
saving faith in spite of the sin whose commission is the natural inheri-
tance of man."' 101
B. APPELLATE REVIEW OF GUARDIANSHIP APPOINTMENTS
Upon receiving the order waiving parental consent, McPhillips
sought and received a stay of the waiver and then appealed Anderson's
ruling to the Court of Civil Appeals. In so doing, McPhillips provided
the Alabama appellate courts an opportunity to rule on the permissibility
of guardianship appointments. But rather than ruling on the broad ques-
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Interview notes supra note 48.
98 In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d at 504.
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tion of whether guardian appointments are legally appropriate in the con-
text of waiver hearings, the Court of Civil Appeals confined itself to the
narrow question of whether a guardian, once appointed, has the right to
appeal the grant of a waiver petition. Dismissing the appeal in a one-
page per curiam opinion, the appellate court explains that the right to an
appeal in such cases is "purely statutory."t 0 2 Furthermore,
[tihe legislature did not provide a right to appeal from
the granting of a petition for waiver of parental consent.
The statute specifically states that an appeal may lie for
any "minor" to whom the court "denies" the petition.
This specific wording does not leave room for judicial
interpretation. In this case no minor was denied a
waiver. Therefore, there is no right to appeal. 10 3
Faced with this dismissal, McPhillips appealed to the Supreme
Court of Alabama. In a ruling issued on August 3, 1998, the high court
affirmed Anderson's decision to grant the waiver of consent. °4 All the
justices concurred in the finding that the minor proved herself to be suffi-
ciently mature and well informed to proceed with the abortion absent
parental involvement. Nevertheless, the ruling was sharply divided.
The key issue of division concerned one of three legal questions that
McPhillips raised: "[D]oes a guardian ad litem, duly appointed by the
Court to represent the unborn child, have a right to appeal the [trial]
court's decision adverse to his (or her) life interest, which may ultimately
result in the involuntary death of the unborn child[?]" 10 5 Answering this
question in the negative, the Court's per curiam ruling, joined by four
justices and concurred with by a fifth, 106 states:
The Legislature, as the Court of Civil Appeals correctly
noted, did not provide a right to appeal from an order
granting a petition for a waiver of parental consent. We
can conclude only that the Legislature understood its
subordinance to the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution and that it recognized that, pursuant
to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade, it could not constitutionally confer upon a non-
viable fetus the right to appeal, through a guardian ad
102 In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497, 497 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (per curiam).
103 Id. at 497.
104 In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497, 497 (Ala. 1998).
105 Id. at 499 (alteration in original).
106 Justices Almon, Shores, Houston, and Kennedy joined the per curiam opinion. Justice
Cook concurred, without opinion. Id.
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litem, an order granting a minor's request to have an
abortion. 10
7
The per curiam opinion rejects the right of the guardian to appeal,
but does not reject, nor confirm the trial court's authority to appoint the
guardian ad litem in the first place. Instead, the per curiam ruling, like
the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals, is silent on this point.
10 8
Diverging from the per curiam opinion, four justices 10 9 would have
granted the guardian a right to appeal. Concurring in part and dissenting
in part, these justices expressly address the legitimacy of guardianship
appointments. They support the trial judge's application of Rule 17(c)
and cite precedent requiring the appointment of a guardian ad litem to
represent the interests of an unborn child during certain types of divorce
proceedings.' 10 Their opinion argues:
If a guardian ad litem is required for an unborn child
when its legitimacy is at stake, then, a fortiori, it would
appear that the appointment of a guardian ad litem, al-
though not specifically provided for in the Parental Con-
sent Statute, would at least be authorized, if not required,
in a case such as this one, involving a minor who is
seeking a waiver of parental consent to have an
abortion. I1I
Having established their position on the legitimacy of guardianship
appointments, the dissenters also note, "[i]t is well settled that a guardian
ad litem appointed to protect the interests of the unborn has a right to
appeal."1 2 Furthermore,
it seems clear that the Legislature intended, in adopting
the Parental Consent Statute, to preserve the life of the
unborn, and that it deliberately was doing what it could
within the constraints of the Federal Constitution, as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, to
107 720 So. 2d at 499-500 (citations omitted).
108 The court's opinion does address another issue raised by McPhillips, namely, whether
the judicial waiver provision of the Alabama parental consent statute deprives parents of due
process of law. The court notes the legislature's intention "to foster 'the family structure,' to
preserve the family 'as a viable social unit,' and to protect 'the rights of parents to rear chil-
dren who are members of their household."' Id. at 500 (quoting ALA. CODE § 26-21-1(a)).
Nevertheless, the court concludes, and with little elaboration, that the statute does not uncon-
stitutionally deny the due process rights of custodial parents. Id.
109 Chief Justice Hooper, and Justices Maddox, See, and Lyons. Id.
110 In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d at 501 (citing Ex parte Martin, 565 So. 2d I (Ala.
1989)).
111 In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d at 502 (Hooper, C.J., Maddox, J., See, J., and Lyons, J.,
concurring specially in part and dissenting in part).
112 Id.
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accomplish that purpose .... The general rule of law is
that guardians ad litem are desirable in many proceed-
ings to ensure that the proceedings will have the adver-
sariness necessary for the full presentation of the issues,
and in the proceedings now here for review such an ap-
pointment would be consistent with the purpose and in-
tent of the Legislature in adopting the Parental Consent
Statute .... [W]e conclude that the Legislature, when it
provided the minor a right to appeal, did not intend to
prohibit a guardian ad litem appointed to represent the
interest of an unborn child from appealing from an ad-
verse order. Stated differently, we do not believe that
the Legislature, by failing specifically to provide in the
Parental Consent Statute for a guardian ad litem's right
to appeal, intended, by omission, to defeat such a right
of appeal.' " 3
Despite supporting this right to appeal, the four dissenting justices
concurred with the per curiam opinion in its judgment that the trial court
did not err in granting the waiver request.' 14
However, with four justices indicating that trial courts may appoint
guardians ad litem to represent the fetus in waiver hearings, and with
another five justices remaining silent on this point, trial courts have re-
tained the discretion to designate an agent to speak on behalf of the fetus.
Appellate review has established little else about guardianship par-
ticipation in waiver hearings. The Court of Civil Appeals did, in one
case, reject a guardian's motion to file an appellate brief in favor of An-
derson's decision to deny a waiver." 5 Beyond that, the appellate courts
113 Id. at 502-03.
114 Id. at 504. The dissenters also concurred in the judgment that the statute did not
violate due process rights of custodial parents. Id. at 503.
115 See In re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (overturning the trial
court's denial of a waiver petition). In a footnote and without explanation or support, the
Court of Civil Appeals writes:
A majority of the [Alabama Supreme] court did not address whether the trial court
had the authority to appoint a guardian for the fetus. Likewise, in this case, we do
not address the propriety of appointing the guardian, and we have denied the guard-
ian's motion to file a brief in support of the trial court's order.
Id. at 431 n.I. The denial of the guardian's motion prompted a separate, one-paragraph con-
currence written by Presiding Judge Robertson and joined by Judge Thompson. Agreeing that
the trial court erred in failing to grant the waiver, Robertson expresses his disagreement with
the majority's decision to deny the guardian's motion to file a brief. Citing the Alabama
Supreme Court's ruling on guardianship appointments, Robertson states:
[I]t appears that Rule 17(c), Ala.R.Civ.P., would permit the appointment of a guard-
ian ad litem to represent the interests of the fetus. It follows that when the trial court
has made such an appointment, the guardian should be entitled to appear before an
appellate court that is considering whether the trial court properly denied a waiver of
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have declined the few opportunities to address guardianship involvement
in waiver hearings. 16
C. IN THE MATTER OF OTHER ANONYMOUS MINORS: THE CONTINUED
USE OF GUARDIANS AD LITEM
The practice of designating guardians ad litem to represent fetuses
in waiver hearings is uncommon. Although there may be instances of
such appointment that I have yet to discover, reports suggest that most
judges who handle waiver petitions in Alabama typically do not assign a
guardian as a voice for the fetus. There are, however, at least two judges
who have adopted the practice as a routine part of waiver proceedings:
Judge Anderson, who inaugurated the practice, and Judge John Cappel,
also of Montgomery County.' 1 7
Including the first case of guardianship appointment, there have
been at least 17 instances in which minors, seeking to waive parental
consent, have been questioned by an appointed representative of the fe-
tus.' 18 Even though four different attorneys have represented the unborn
in Montgomery County,1 19 their objective has been the same: to protect
the fetus' interest in being born. To achieve this end, the guardian at-
tempts to persuade the minor to forgo the abortion or, short of achieving
that goal, to secure a denial of the minor's waiver request.
The guardians' strategies and the character of the hearings have va-
ried. While all minors have faced extensive questioning by the guardian,
witnesses have testified on behalf of the fetus in only four of the 17
cases.' 20 With regard to the character of the hearings, the first was, by
parental consent to the minor ... and should be allowed to submit a brief in support
of the trial court's judgment, as the guardian sought to do here.
Id. at 433 (Robertson, J., concurring in the result) (citation omitted).
116 The Alabama Supreme Court recently sidestepped an occasion to address the propriety
of designating guardians. See Ex parte Anonymous, No. 1001856, 2001 Ala. LEXIS 295
(Ala. July 30, 2001). The minor appealed the denial of her waiver petition and questioned
whether the trial court had violated her constitutional rights by designating fetal representation.
Id. at *6. Finding that the trial judge had erred in denying the waiver, the court further stated,
"[i]n light of our holding, we pretermit any discussion of [the minor's] argument concerning
the trial court's appointment of a lawyer to represent the fetus." Id. at *24.
117 The presiding judge in Montgomery County, Judge Richard Dorrough, conducts
waiver hearings without designating fetal representation. Interview notes supra note 48.
118 Interview notes supra note 48. In an additional instance where the court appointed a
guardian ad litem to represent the fetus, the minor did not pursue a waiver and the hearing was
cancelled. The reason for the minor's failure to pursue the waiver is unclear. Id.
119 After Julian McPhillips' involvement in the first case of guardianship appointment,
Judges Anderson and Cappel turned to three other attorneys to represent the unborn. One of
these three attorneys acted as guardian in 13 of the cases heard after the Alabama Supreme
Court rejected the. appeal brought by McPhillips. Interview notes supra note 48.
120 Among the witnesses called were the director of Sav-A-Life, the director of COPE
Crisis Pregnancy Center, and a woman who performs counseling at Sav-A-Life. See In re
Anonymous, 733 So. 2d at 430.
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all accounts, acrimonious. 121 Two other early hearings involving
guardians were lengthy and intense, but somewhat less contentious.
Since those hearings, guardian participation has become more routine.
As a result, the hearings have become more expedient and less
confrontational.
If part of the guardian's goal is to secure a denial of the waiver
petition, we can measure their success in this regard. In 13 of these 17
cases, the trial court granted minors their waiver requests. Of the four
minors denied their petitions, three ultimately obtained permission to by-
pass parental involvement. 122 In short, all but one of the 17 minors faced
with questioning by a representative of the fetus successfully waived pa-
rental involvement. 123
However, to measure a guardian's success only in terms of the deni-
als of waiver petitions presents a misleading picture of what the guardi-
ans seek to accomplish at these hearings. There is no question that,
through their questioning and calling of witnesses, the guardians hope to
convince the minor to carry the fetus to term. Guardians who have repre-
sented fetuses do not deny that this is their aim. Among other things,
they endeavor to demonstrate to the minor that there is a living human
being growing inside her body, that the minor may suffer physically and
emotionally as a result of aborting the fetus, that some women who have
abortions develop psychological problems and may even become sui-
cidal, that there are many families willing to adopt, and that money is
available to assist with both prenatal care and the raising of children.
24
121 Juvenile Judge Mark Anderson provided this description. See Bach, supra note 8, at
7.
122 See in re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (reversing the trial
court's denial of a waiver petition); In re Anonymous, No. 2000932, 2001 Ala. Civ. App.
LEXIS 312 (Ala. Civ. App. June 15, 2001) (concluding that the judgment of the trial court was
fatally flawed and remanding the case to the court to enter an order complying with the appli-
cable statute); Ex parte Anonymous, No. 1001856, 2001 Ala. LEXIS 295 (Ala. July 30, 2001)
(reversing the trial court's denial of a waiver petition). On remand, the trial court reportedly
granted the waiver petition. Interview notes supra note 48.
123 The one minor who did not succeed in her appeal of the trial court's ruling lost her
case on technical grounds. The Court of Civil Appeals voided the trial court's judgment and
dismissed the appeal because the waiver petition was wrongly filed in Montgomery County.
See In re Anonymous, No. 2000887, 2001 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 308 (Ala. Civ. App. June
13, 2001). Whether the minor filed another waiver petition is unclear.
124 For example, the Alabama Supreme Court relayed the questioning of a minor by one
guardian:
The lawyer appointed for the fetus, described in the record as a guardian ad litem,
subjected [the minor] to a probing cross-examination concerning her knowledge of
the negative consequences of undergoing an abortion and the possible consequences,
including depression, sterility, and death. The appointed lawyer's cross-examination
also explored at some length [the minor's] knowledge of the alternatives to abortion,
including having her family help raise the baby or placing the baby for adoption.
Ex parte Anonymous, Ala. LEXIS No. 1001856 at *8 (Ala. 2001).
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Whether guardians are successful in convincing pregnant minors to
give birth is an open question. While some guardians have reported their
impressions that minors may have changed their minds about proceeding
with an abortion, their impressions cannot be confirmed. 125
Nevertheless, hearings with guardians ad litem have resulted in
some rather unusual judicial orders. According to the accounts of those
interviewed, in one case the court granted a minor's waiver request, but
the trial judge ordered a three-day "cooling off' period between the time
the waiver was granted and the time the minor could obtain an abor-
tion.126 In two other cases, the guardian moved for a continuance of the
waiver hearing so that the minor could seek counseling from a pro-life
organization. The court granted the guardian's motion in each of these
instances, and the minors in question sought counseling from a pro-life
group before returning, again, to the court for a continuation of the judi-
cial proceedings and the ultimate granting of their waiver requests. 27
Guardianship appointments have substantially altered the nature of
waiver hearings in Montgomery County. To be sure, Julian McPhillips'
handling of guardianship responsibilities has not become the norm. Still,
those who petition for a waiver of parental consent before Anderson or
Cappel face very different hearings than do minors who appear before
most other Alabama juvenile court judges.
D. THE FUTURE OF GUARDIANSHIP APPOINTMENTS
Some have suggested that the appointment of guardians to represent
the unborn is "the wave of the future" in abortion regulations. 128
Whether this is true remains to be seen. Still, the state has already made
efforts to advance its interest in protecting the unborn. In 1999, the Ala-
bama state legislature proposed a bill requiring a court to appoint an at-
torney in waiver hearings to represent the state, and granting to the trial
court the option of designating a guardian to represent the unborn.' 29
125 Since the identities of minors are confidential, determining whether they have gone
through with the abortion is not possible.
126 Interview notes supra note 48.
127 Id. A public record of these two cases is not available since the minors were granted
their waiver requests.
128 Among those who have described guardianship appointments in this way is Julian
McPhillips. Asked on a television news program whether he expected that his case would be
"used in other states in the future," he responded by saying, "Very much so. In fact, I've
gotten calls from many other states and many other lawyers about this, and I think it will be
the wave of the future." SHORT, supra note 71, at 325.
129 S.B. 389, 1999 Reg. Sess. (1999 Ala.). Sections 26-21-4 (i)-(j) of the proposed legis-
lation would have provided for the following:
(i) . .. [T]he Attorney General or his or her representative shall participate as an
advocate for the state to examine the petitioner and any witnesses, and to present
evidence for the purpose of providing the court with a sufficient record upon which
to make an informed decision and to do substantial justice.
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Drafted by the president of the Alabama Pro-Life Coalition, the bill died
in committee, but not before Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor en-
dorsed it. 130 Pryor stated that "[a]n attorney representing the government
should be involved to protect the state's interest in preserving life."' 3' In
addition, "Pryor said he envisioned attorneys with networks like Ala-
bama Lawyers for Life, of which he was a member, agreeing to represent
the state for free and 'potentially' taking an adversarial [position] against
abortions." 32
In addition, the 1998 Alabama Supreme Court ruling denying a
guardian the right to appeal the granting of waivers may not have staying
power. Since that ruling, Alabama has elected a new Chief Justice to its
high court, Roy Moore, popularly known as the "Ten Commandments
Judge" for his fight to display the Ten Commandments in his court-
room.133 Along with Moore's election, two new Republican justices (re-
placing two Democratic justices) joined the state's highest court. The
election expanded Republican control of the Court from 5-4 to 8-1.
With the shifting composition of the Alabama Supreme Court, rul-
ings on waiver petitions have already begun to change. On June 1, 2001,
the Court upheld a trial judge's decision to deny a waiver of parental
consent. Notably, the Moore Court used its first opportunity to review a
waiver of consent denial to reverse standing precedent. In its per curiam
ruling, the Court altered the standard of review appellate courts are to
apply in cases where minors appeal denials of waiver requests. For
many years, when reviewing denials of waiver petitions, Alabama prece-
dent held that the role of the appellate court was "to determine whether
the trial court 'misapplied the law to the undisputed facts."'" 34 Under
(j) In the court's discretion, it may appoint a guardian ad litem for the interests of the
unborn child of the petitioner who shall also have the same rights and obligations of
participation in the proceeding as given to the Attorney General.
130 See Jay Reeves, Bill Would Involve State Attorneys in Juvenile Abortion Cases, Asso-
CIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Feb. 23, 1999. The Legislative Reference Service of the State of
Alabama reported to me that the bill died in committee.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 See Phillips Rawls, Moore Says Courts Misinterpret Separation of Church and State,
ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, May 30, 2001. "When Moore was a circuit judge
in Gadsden, he fought a legal battle with the ACLU and others to keep his handmade plaque of
the Ten Commandments posted in his courtroom. The litigation ended without a ruling on the
merits of the case, but Moore's fight made him a national figure and helped get him elected
chiefjustice." Id. Since becoming Alabama's Chief Justice, Moore has continued to live up to
his reputation as the Ten Commandments Judge. On August 1, 2001, Moore unveiled a two-
ton monument displaying the Ten Commandments in the Alabama Supreme Court rotunda.
Moore installed the monument on his own authority and without consulting the other justices
on the Court. See Mitch Albom, Why We Need Wall Between Church, State, DETROIT FREE
PREss, Aug. 5, 2001, at 1E.
134 Ex parte Anonymous, 618 So. 2d 722, 725 (Ala. 1993) (quoting In re Anonymous,
515 So. 2d 1254, 1256 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987)).
[Vol. 11:69
IN THE MATTER OF ANONYMOUS, A MINOR
the new standard, the appellate courts apply the ore tenus rule, whereby a
trial court's finding "is accorded, on appeal, a presumption of correctness
which will not be disturbed unless plainly erroneous or manifestly un-
just." 135 This change makes it substantially more difficult for an appel-
late court to overturn a trial judge's order denying a waiver. As
Presiding Judge Sharon Yates of the Court of Civil Appeals states in that
court's first application of the new standard, "a minor appealing a trial
judge's denial of an application for a judicial waiver of parental consent
will meet an impossible hurdle. I cannot conceive of any fact situation
where a minor would be able to overcome the trial judge's denial of the
waiver."136
The shift in membership on the Alabama Supreme Court and the
Court's reversal of precedent may foreshadow other changes. Should the
Alabama Supreme Court decide to explicitly rule on the propriety of
guardianship appointments, it will likely validate them. In addition,
should the court decide to reverse precedent by holding that guardians do
have a right to appeal the granting of a waiver, this should come as no
surprise.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
GUARDIANSHIP APPOINTMENTS
Given the continued use and likely expansion of guardianship ap-
pointments, it is worth investigating whether such appointments are con-
sistent with constitutional mandates concerning parental involvement in
minors' abortion decisions. The assessment will take into account the
constitutionality of both the specific case of guardianship appointments
in Montgomery, Alabama, as well as the general case of guardianship
appointments. This section begins with an analysis of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey and the standard to be applied in determining the
constitutional soundness of the use of guardians. The section then turns
to an assessment of the purpose of guardianship appointments (both in
Alabama and the general case), followed by an evaluation of the effect
of guardianship appointments (again, both in the specific and general
cases).
135 Ex parte Anonymous, No. 1001488, 2001 Ala. LEXIS 202, at *8 (Ala. June 1, 2001)
(quoting Noland Co. v. Southern Dev. Co., 445 So. 2d 266, 268 (Ala. 1984)).
136 In re Anonymous, No. 2000884, 2001 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 305, at *3 (Ala. Civ.
App. June 8, 2001).
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A. PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY 13 7
As noted earlier, the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey
establishes the constitutional standard for evaluating state abortion regu-
lations, namely, the undue burden standard.' 38 Thus, to determine
whether guardianship appointments in waiver hearings are constitution-
ally sound, the following question must be answered: Does the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem to represent the fetus during a waiver hearing
impose an undue burden on a pregnant minor? That is, does such an
appointment have "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus?" 139 If
not, then a state's employment of guardians need only be reasonably re-
lated to advancing its legitimate interests.
140
The Supreme Court offers the following guidance in an effort to
elaborate the undue burden standard:
What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ulti-
mate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others
in doing so. Regulations which do no more than create a
structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or
guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for
the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a
substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right
to choose. . . . Unless it has that effect on her right of
choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to
choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reason-
ably related to that goal.'
4 1
Under certain circumstances states clearly may declare a preference
for childbirth over abortion.142 Moreover, in direct contrast to the
137 Although the Court ruling in Casey did not gain majority support, it is nonetheless
taken to be standing precedent on abortion. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d
1452, 1456 n.7 (1995) ("We view the joint opinion [in Casey] as the Supreme Court's
definitive statement of the constitutional law on abortion"). As such, when discussing Casey, I
will take the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter to be the operative
precedent.
138 Casey does not explicitly apply the undue burden test when upholding Pennsylvania's
parental consent mandate. However, it is fair to say, given Supreme Court precedents and
other federal appellate rulings, that the undue burden test governs state regulations of minors'
abortion rights. See, e.g., Akron II, 497 U.S. at 519-20 (holding that Ohio's parental notifica-
tion requirement does not impose an undue burden on minors); Planned Parenthood v. Miller,
63 F.3d at 1460 (invalidating South Dakota's parental notification requirement based on the
undue burden standard).
'39 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (joint opinion).
140 Id. at 878.
141 Id. at 877-78 (citations omitted).
142 See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) ("[T]he Constitu-
tion does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a prefer-
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Court's earlier holding in Roe v. Wade, regulations designed to protect
potential life are permissible throughout pregnancy. While acknowledg-
ing the state's "important and legitimate interest in protecting the potenti-
ality of human life,"'143 Roe established that only with the onset of the
third trimester of pregnancy does the state's interest in potential life be-
come compelling enough to warrant measures to protect that life. 144 Al-
tering this holding, Casey declares that the state's substantial interest in
potential life justifies efforts to protect that life throughout pregnancy. 1 45
Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or
continue her pregnancy before viability, it does not at all
follow that the State is prohibited from taking steps to
ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed. Even
in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact
rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know
that there are philosophic and social arguments of great
weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing
the pregnancy to full term and that there are procedures
and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children
as well as a certain degree of state assistance if the
mother chooses to raise the child herself. "'The Consti-
tution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to demo-
cratic processes, from expressing a preference for
normal childbirth."' It follows that States are free to en-
act laws to provide a reasonable framework for a woman
to make a decision that has such profound and lasting
meaning. ' 46
Thus, the authors of the joint opinion in Casey conclude:
To promote the State's profound interest in potential life,
throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to
ensure that the woman's choice is informed, and mea-
sures designed to advance this interest will not be invali-
dated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman
to choose childbirth over abortion.1 47
Casey is not specific with respect to how far states may go in per-
suading women to pursue childbirth rather than abortion. Indeed, notice-
ence for normal childbirth."); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding Connecticut's
prohibition of funding for non-therapeutic abortions).
143 Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
144 Id. at 163, 164.
145 Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 joint opinion).
146 Id. at 872-73 (quoting Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989))
(citations omitted).
147 Id. at 878.
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ably absent from the joint ruling is treatment of the distinction between
persuasion and pressure. Justice Blackmun, writing separately, attempts
to limit what the state may do when encouraging abortion, saying that
such "measures must be designed to ensure that a woman's choice is
'mature and informed,' not intimidated, imposed, or impelled."1 48 But
the joint opinion, in telling silence, offers no such guidance.
Casey does indicate that measures aimed at encouraging pregnancy
must not impose an undue burden on the right to abortlon. 140 go what
constitutes an undue burden? The joint opinion explains that,
the means chosen by the State to further the interest in
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's
free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while
furthering the interest in potential life or some other
valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman's choice cannot be con-
sidered a permissible means of serving its legitimate
ends. 150
In addition to the Court's attempts to delineate what counts as un-
duly burdensome, its rulings on specific abortion regulations are instruc-
tive. According to the Casey joint opinion, informed consent
requirements that mandate the provision of certain information before an
abortion may be performed on a woman-minor or adult-do not neces-
sarily run afoul of the Constitution. Even if that information pertains not
to the woman's health but to the health and development of her fetus,
states may thus regulate abortion as long as,
the information the State requires to be made available
to the woman is truthful and not misleading .... In short,
requiring that the woman be informed of the availability
of information relating to fetal development and the as-
sistance available should she decide to carry the preg-
nancy to full term is a reasonable measure to ensure an
informed choice, one which might cause the woman to
choose childbirth over abortion. This requirement can-
148 Casey, 505 U.S. at 936 n.7 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judg-
ment in part, and dissenting in part) (quoting Casey joint opinion, 505 U.S. at 883) (citation
omitted). Blackmun continues by saying,
To this end, when the State requires the provision of certain information, the State
may not alter the manner of presentation in order to inflict "psychological abuse,"
designed to shock or unnerve a woman seeking to exercisc her liberty right. This,
for example, would appear to preclude a State from requiring a woman to view
graphic literature or films detailing the performance of an abortion operation.
Id. (quoting Casey joint opinion, 505 U.S. at 893) (citation omitted).
149 Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (joint opinion).
150 Id. at 877.
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not be considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining an
abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burden. 151
Like informed consent, a state mandated 24-hour waiting period be-
tween the provision of consent information and the performance of an
abortion is permissible. "In theory, at least, the waiting period is a rea-
sonable measure to implement the State's interest in protecting the life of
the unborn . ,,152 Even though informed consent and waiting require-
ments may entail added costs, they do not necessarily amount to a sub-
stantial obstacle.
[N]ot every law which makes a right more difficult to
exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right ....
The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not
designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental
effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to
procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. 153
In contrast, a substantial obstacle is imposed when states require
spousal notification before the performance of an abortion.1 54 Unlike 24-
hour waiting periods and informed consent, spousal notification is,
likely to prevent a significant number of women from
obtaining an abortion. It does not merely make abor-
tions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain; for
many women, it will impose a substantial obstacle. We
must not blind ourselves to the fact that the significant
number of women who fear for their safety and the
safety of their children are likely to be deterred from
procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth
had outlawed abortion in all cases.1 55
Also unconstitutional are certain prohibitions of so-called "partial-
birth abortions." In Stenberg v. Carhart, 156 the Court invalidated a Ne-
braska statute that criminalized the performance of "partial-birth abor-
tions." Because the statute endangered rather than protected a woman's
health, the Court found it unduly burdensome. In addition, since the
"partial-birth abortion" statute proscribed only a certain type of abortion
151 Id. at 882-83.
152 Id. at 885. The Court leaves open the possibility that an "as applied" challenge might
demonstrate the unduly burdensome character of 24-hour waiting periods. However, the joint
opinion concludes, based on the record and in light of the facial challenge, that a 24-hour delay
does not create an undue burden. Id. at 887.
153 Id. at 873-74.
154 Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
155 Id. at 893-94.
156 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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procedure, it could not be justified by the state's interest in protecting
potential life.
We can infer from its analysis of these different measures what the
Court means by "substantial obstacle." An abortion regulation is not a
"substantial obstacle" if it merely makes abortion more difficult to ob-
tain. To rise to the level of a "substantial obstacle," an abortion regula-
tion must have the purpose or effect of stopping women from obtaining
safe abortions. That women would confront considerable challenges in
the face of an abortion measure is not sufficient to find the measure con-
stitutionally flawed.
The joint opinion in Casey declares that states may not "hinder"
abortion. 57 Nevertheless, the joint opinion's declaration belies every-
thing else established in Casey about what states may do with respect to
impeding abortion. As Justice Scalia correctly observes,
The joint opinion explains that a state regulation imposes
an "undue burden" if it "has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." An obstacle is
"substantial," we are told, if it is "calculated[,] [not] to
inform the woman's free choice, [but to] hinder it." This
latter statement cannot possibly mean what it says. Any
regulation of abortion that is intended to advance what
the joint opinion concedes is the State's "substantial" in-
terest in protecting unborn life will be "calculated [to]
hinder" a decision to have an abortion.' 58
This point could not have been lost on the authors of the joint opin-
ion. Thus, the line drawn by the joint opinion in Casey is not between
encouragement of childbirth and hindrance of abortion, but between en-
couragement of childbirth and discouragement of abortion on the one
hand and the prevention of safe abortions on the other hand. We can
fairly surmise, then, that the joint opinion establishes that states may hin-
der abortion, at least insofar as the encouragement of childbirth consti-
tutes a hindrance to abortion. The only thing states may not do when
encouraging childbirth is set up mechanisms that are likely to stop wo-
men from successfully obtaining abortions (e.g., spousal notification) or
are likely to undermine the women's health and safety (e.g., outlawing
certain types of abortion procedures). This, then, is what undue burden
means: regulations that fall short of stopping abortion and do not entail
157 505 U.S. at 877. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
158 Id. at 986-87 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quot-
ing Casey joint opinion, 505 U.S. at 877, 877-79, 877 n.4) (citations omitted) (alteration in
original).
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health risks are permissible, regardless of their otherwise burdensome
qualities.
B. THE PURPOSE OF GUARDIANSHIP APPOINTMENTS
Let us turn now to the purpose of designating guardians. As noted
earlier, the Alabama Parental Consent Statute is silent with respect to the
fetus.' 59 Even in the statute's recitation of legislative purpose and find-
ings, there is no explicit reference to the fetus, to its interests, or to the
state's interest in the life of the fetus:
Legislative purpose and findings.
a) It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this pa-
rental consent provision to further the important and
compelling state interests of: (1) protecting minors
against their own immaturity, (2) fostering the family
structure and preserving it as a viable social unit, and
(3) protecting the rights of parents to rear children
who are members of their household.
b) The legislature finds as fact that: (1) immature mi-
nors often lack the ability to make fully informed
choices that take account of both immediate and
long-range consequences, (2) the medical, emotional
and psychological consequences of abortion are seri-
ous and can be lasting, particularly when the patient
is immature, (3) the capacity to become pregnant and
the capacity for mature judgment concerning the wis-
dom of an abortion are not necessarily related, (4)
parents ordinarily possess information essential to a
physician's exercise of his best medical judgment
concerning the child, and (5) parents who are aware
that their minor daughter has had an abortion may
better insure that she receives adequate medical atten-
tion after her abortion. The legislature further finds
that parental consultation is usually desirable and in
the best interests of the minor. 160
Despite the lack of explicit reference to the fetus, it is possible to
infer an interest in the life of the unborn from the Parental Consent Stat-
ute. Four justices of the Alabama Supreme Court made such an infer-
ence in 1998:
159 See supra Part II.
160 ALA. CODE § 26-21-1 (Michie 1992).
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In view of this stated legislative intent and purpose, it
seems clear that the Legislature intended, in adopting the
Parental Consent Statute, to preserve the life of the un-
born, and that it deliberately was doing what it could
within the constraints of the Federal Constitution, as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, to
accomplish that purpose.'61
Even without this inference from the statute, Rule 17(c) of the Ala-
bama Rules of Civil Procedure provides some indication of the state's
interest: "[W]hen the interest of an infant unborn or unconceived is
before the court, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for such inter-
est."' 162 With Rule 17(c) in place, the state has an explicit expression of
its own interest in providing guardianship for the unborn.
However, since Rule 17(c) leaves the decision to appoint a guardian
to the discretion of the court, and since the legislature did not directly
provide for the appointment of guardians for the fetus in the context of
waiver hearings, it is appropriate to look to the judges' purpose in mak-
ing these appointments. Upon doing so, it becomes apparent that guardi-
anship appointments are designed to protect the life of the fetus by
persuading the minor to choose childbirth rather than abortion. Two
points, taken together, demonstrate that this is the case: (1) the ideologi-
cal motivations of the judges who appoint guardians, and (2) the fact that
no other purpose, aside from advocating childbirth over abortion, is
served by these appointments.
By all accounts, even their own, Judges Anderson and Cappel are
opposed to abortion. There is little question that it is their opposition to
abortion that generated the unusual move of appointing guardians for the
unborn.
It is not surprising that some of the attorneys representing minors
explain the appointment of guardians in terms of the ideological views of
the judges. As Beverly Howard stated in a televised interview after rep-
resenting the minor in the first case involving a guardian:
I think this case came about because the judge assigned
to hear it is well-known as an opponent of abortion-as
is Mr. McPhillips, who is a member of 'Attorneys for
Life'-and not necessarily because he believes that's the
law .... What's happening is that people who oppose
abortion are using this as a forum to get to people-or to
girls-that they normally wouldn't even be able to speak
161 In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497, 502-03 (Ala. 1998) (Hooper, C.J., Maddox, J.,
See, J. and Lyons, J., concurring specially in part and dissenting in part).
162 Id. at 499 n.2.
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to outside of a clinic. In the courtroom they're able to
get within two feet of them, and a girl-in this case a
minor girl-is ordered to answer the questions asked.
And some of them, I think, are highly inappropriate for a
judicial setting. 163
Others who have represented minors before Anderson and Cappel
share Howard's interpretation. But they are not alone. Designated guard-
ians have similarly characterized the pro-life views of these two judges
as the motivating force behind the appointments. Consider Julian
McPhillips's explanation of why he was chosen to act as guardian: "I
have a heart for unborn children just as I do for other underdogs and
victims I represent in my law practice. In fact, I say there's no greater
underdog, or victim, in life ... and I emphasize the words 'in life' ...
than a baby who's about to be killed in his or her mother's own
womb."'164 When McPhillips explained to me how he came to represent
the fetus, he said, "Well, the judge who was handling the case was a
conservative Republican, very pro-life and he knew I was pro-life." An-
other guardian suggested that the judges' decisions to appoint representa-
tion for fetuses were motivated, in part, by a desire to persuade the minor
to carry the pregnancy to term.
In addition to these characterizations, the judges' conduct in waiver
hearings reveals their opposition to abortion as their motivation to ap-
point guardians. 165 In their written rulings on waiver petitions, Anderson
and Cappel express their pro-life views. When granting waivers, it is not
uncommon for these judges to state that, despite their opposition to abor-
tion, they are constrained by the parameters of the law to grant the peti-
tion. Both judges typically remind the minor in the written order that
such a grant does not require her to have an abortion.
Furthermore, Anderson indicated in one of his written orders his
"fixed opinion that abortion is wrong."'166 In another case, he granted the
waiver only after writing that it was his "regretful" finding that the minor
was sufficiently informed to have the abortion. 167
Reports about Cappel's handling of waiver hearings suggest that he
makes his pro-life views clear to the minors who petition for relief from
mandated parental consent. He tells the young women that he wants
163 Quoted in SHORT, supra note 71, at 320.
164 Id. at 320-21 (alteration in original).
165 Evidence concerning the judges' conduct derives from four sources: 1) appellate rul-
ings that recount the judges' written findings, 2) reports of those in attendance at waiver hear-
ings, 3) news reports of waiver hearings, and 4) an interview with Judge Anderson. Where my
description of judicial conduct derives from appellate rulings and news reports, I will note it as
such.
166 Bach, supra note 8, at 7.
167 Id.
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them to consider the life of this baby and to understand that choosing
abortion will stop the beating heart of a perfectly formed baby. He fur-
ther suggests that should the young woman requesting a waiver decide
not to pursue an abortion, then several months down the road she will be
a mother with her own baby.
In light of their views about abortion, it is a short leap to conclude
that Anderson and Cappel appoint guardians in order to protect the life of
the fetus. Anderson's case however, requires no leap at all. In an inter-
view about his handling of waiver petitions, Anderson explained his
practice of appointing guardians. Reading from an unspecified Alabama
ruling not dealing with parental consent for abortion, Anderson said that
the trial court "has a heavy burden in proceedings involving minor chil-
dren... [Olur supreme court has said 'It is the.., court's duty to guard
and protect the interest of its infant wards with scrupulous care."' 1 68 An-
derson went on to explain that, in light of this, judges have a heavy bur-
den in waiver cases, and, specifically, a duty to protect children, both
born and unborn. He further described why he requires minors to go to
Sav-A-Life prior to any ruling he might make on their waiver requests:
"Both Judge Cappel and I will want them to have been to Sav-A-Life to
see what there is to help them make the right decision. And hopefully to
make them see that abortion is not the right decision, because I believe it
is the wrong decision."' 169 When asked to reflect on the fact that his
appointment of a guardian may turn out to be a precedent-setting move,
he offered the following telling response: "I don't really focus on being
the father of something, because I've got plenty more stuff to do. But if
it saves a life, it was worth it.' '170
In further explaining his application of Rule 17(c), Anderson stated
that waiver petitions should not be taken lightly by minors or rubber-
stamped by the judiciary. He admitted that the presence of a guardian ad
litem makes waiver hearings more challenging, but not so challenging
that it creates an unconstitutional obstacle in the minor's path to ob-
taining an abortion.' 7 ' Instead, Anderson suggested that, in addition to
protecting the interests of the fetus, these appointments also serve the
interests of the minor.' 72 In particular, these appointments provide the
opportunity for the proper questioning to determine whether the minor is
sufficiently mature and informed to make the abortion decision and
168 Interview notes supra note 48. While Anderson did not specify what ruling he was
referring to, the quoted language is from Stevens v. Everett, 784 So. 2d 1054 (Ala. 2000) and
Ray v. Ray, 782 So. 2d 797 (Ala. 2000) (both quoting Davis v. Davis, 743 So. 2d 486, 487
(Ala. Civ. App. 1999)).
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whether the abortion is in the minor's best interest. In other words, the
appointment of a guardian serves the purpose of ensuring that the minor
is asked the right questions at the waiver hearing, and that the judge is
not forced into the position of cross-examining the young women. An-
derson, not wanting to take on the role of inquisitor, can thus leave the
questioning to the guardian.
That the participation of the guardian ad litem relieves the judge
from the position of extensively questioning minors does not mean that
this is the primary intent of guardianship appointments. If this were in-
deed the primary motivating factor, the judge would not appoint a guard-
ian to represent the fetus. Instead, the judge would, in addition to
appointing legal counsel for the minor, appoint a guardian to protect the
interests of the minor. The only reason to appoint a guardian for the
fetus rather than the minor is to protect the fetus' interest, not to guaran-
tee that the minor has met her burden of proof to obtain a waiver.
Consider also the position of the designated guardian of the fetus.
The guardian must, by law, do what is in her power to protect that fetus.
Under such direction, guardians will in most circumstances define the
interests of the fetus in terms of an interest in being born.173 That inter-
est, in the context of a waiver hearing, translates directly into one clear
goal: preventing the minor from aborting the fetus. Anderson and Cap-
pel surely understand this and appreciate the consequences of appointing
a guardian for the fetus as opposed to appointing a guardian for the
minor.
Thus, while Anderson is right to suggest that designating a guardian
for the unborn saves the judge from having to extensively question the
minor, this benefit is ancillary. By choosing to appoint a guardian for the
fetus, it is reasonable to conclude that these judges seek to protect the
interests of the fetus not the pregnant teen. As Anderson explained to a
minor in a recent waiver hearing,
What you have asked the Court to allow you to do is
something that is extremely serious and fatal for your
child. And it has been my practice for three years now
when I'm faced with these cases to not only have a law-
yer for you but to have a lawyer to represent the interest
of the unborn child, and that's why he is here. Both of
these lawyers have been in many-I would even say too
many-of these cases, because even one is too many. 174
173 In fact, this is what guardians say when asked what their goal is at waiver hearings.
Interview notes supra note 48.
174 In re Anonymous, No. 2001026, 2001 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 347, at *4 (Ala. Civ.
App. July 18, 2001) (Yates, J., dissenting).
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In view of the above, it is clear that these two pro-life judges intend
to encourage childbirth and discourage abortion, and that guardianship
appointments serve this end. Indeed, by designating guardians to re-
present the fetus, these judges provide a forum to present the minor with
pro-life views, views that seek to dissuade the minor from aborting her
fetus. These are self-described pro-life judges confronted by a statute
that requires them, in certain circumstances, to allow the performance of
an abortion. Faced with a law that requires a judicial decision grounded
not on whether abortion is moral or immoral, a judge's strongly held
personal views about abortion are put to the test. Unlike other judges
who have recused themselves in such circumstances, 75 these judges, em-
ploying their discretionary powers, have found a way not to avoid the
waiver process, but to alter it in a manner that places the pro-life position
at center stage.
Is it fair, then, to conclude that Anderson and Cappel intend to place
a "substantial obstacle" in the minor's path to abortion by appointing
guardians? There can be no doubt that the expression "substantial obsta-
cle," understood as an expression in ordinary language, is predicable of
these judges' intent. However, in the current context, this expression is a
technical term, given meaning by the stipulative pronouncements of the
U.S. Supreme Court. This, of course, is the context within which the
question arises.
As detailed above, the state and agents of the state may "create a
structural mechanism ... [to] express profound respect for the life of the
unborn .... ,176 This is precisely what the appointment of a guardian for
the fetus is designed to achieve. The designation of a guardian is "aimed
at ensuring that a woman's choice contemplates the consequences for the
fetus,"' 177 and this aim, Casey tells us, does "not necessarily interfere
with the right recognized in Roe."'178
The appointment of guardians ad litem in Alabama has forced mi-
nors to confront new and considerable challenges. Facing a guardian is,
as I will argue in the following section, burdensome and makes an al-
ready challenging waiver hearing all the more burdensome. We can also
surmise that these appointments are intended, in part, to make the hear-
ing more difficult. But because we can reasonably cast the judges' pri-
mary purpose in terms of encouraging childbirth and discouraging
abortion, rather than in terms of preventing abortion, Casey makes it pos-
175 Judges in Massachusetts and Minnesota, for example, have cited moral considerations
when recusing themselves from handling waiver petitions. See Patricia Donovan, Judging
Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek Court-Authorized Abortions, 15 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 259, 264, 265 (1983); see also Scamecchia & Field, supra note 5.
176 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (joint opinion). See also supra Part III.A.
177 Id. at 873.
178 Id.
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sible, even plausible, to conclude that the motivation behind appointing
guardians in Alabama is constitutionally permissible. Although the line
between encouraging childbirth and preventing abortion is a fine one, 179
Casey requires that line to be drawn in determining the constitutionality
of abortion regulations. Thus, since we can say that guardianship ap-
pointments are intended to encourage childbirth by discouraging minors
from waiving parental consent and obtaining abortions, and since such
discouragement is allowable under Casey, the purpose of guardianship
appointments in Alabama could and arguably would pass the undue bur-
den test.
Perhaps Anderson and Cappel have crossed the line, and their be-
havior is not consistent with an intent to merely encourage childbirth
over abortion. Perhaps it could be argued that their behavior manifests a
clear intent to prevent abortion. It is not clear to me that we have yet
invented a razor fine enough to split this hair. Nevertheless, even if it is
true that Anderson and Cappel have, as it were, said too much, this
would only lead to the conclusion that their application of Rule 17(c) is
unconstitutional. It would not, of course, prevent Alabama or any state,
with the specific and stated intent of encouraging childbirth over abor-
tion, from passing legislation requiring fetal representation at waiver
hearings. As long as states articulate their interest as protecting potential
life, and not as preventing abortion, guardianship appointments will fit
into the Casey framework and the states' purposes for regulating abortion
will be constitutionally acceptable.
C. THE EFFECT OF GUARDIANSHIP APPOINTMENTS ON MINORS
If guardianship appointments are not intended to stop minors from
obtaining abortions, they may yet be unduly burdensome under Casey if
their effect creates such an impediment. A comparison of Alabama
waiver hearings with and without guardians will illuminate the impact of
fetal representation.
Consider what we know about a typical waiver hearing in Alabama,
that is, one that does not include a guardian ad litem for the fetus. The
minor has to make arrangements to travel to the courthouse, meet with an
attorney, and go before a judge, all the while trying to maintain her ano-
nymity and during what is already a trying time in the young woman's
life. The result is added delay in obtaining an abortion and the
probability of the need for additional excuses to explain her absence
from school, work, or home. The hearings, though, are relatively short.
Present at the hearing are the judge, the minor, her legal counsel, any
witnesses her counsel chooses to call, and maybe one or two members of
179 See supra Part IIl.A and infra Part IV.
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the court (e.g., a court reporter, a member of the clerk's office). By all
accounts, minors are nervous, intimidated, and anxious at the prospect of
being questioned about a private and personal matter in front of a judge
and other strangers.
Now consider what we know about those minors who have encoun-
tered guardians during waiver hearings. The minor still has to make the
requisite arrangements to go to court, meet with an attorney, and so forth.
But with the presence of a guardian, the hearings are longer. As already
noted, some have lasted on the order of several hours; most others aver-
age about an hour. 180 In addition, some minors have confronted testi-
mony from pro-life advocates. All have faced extensive cross-
examination from an attorney whose legal mission it is to see to it that
the minor gives birth.181 In short, what is, in the absence of a guardian,
essentially a non-adversarial, fact-finding inquiry becomes, with the
presence of a guardian, an adversarial proceeding.182
With guardians and the possibility of witnesses, the anonymity of
the minor is put at greater risk, although there is no evidence to suggest
that a minor's identity has been compromised as a result of the additional
parties and witnesses. Furthermore, in some instances, the courts have
lengthened the delay associated with the required waiver hearings, in one
case by a three-day cooling-off period,183 in another case by two appeals
filed by the guardian, 184 and in two more cases by a judicial order requir-
ing counseling from pro-life advocates. 185 In the cases of the two minors
who were ordered to seek pro-life counseling, an abortion without paren-
tal consent was only attainable after initial consultation with an abortion
provider, a trip to the courthouse for a waiver hearing, a trip to a pro-life
organization for counseling, and another trip to the courthouse for the
continuation of the waiver hearing-four trips in all before the final trip
to have an abortion. All this while the minor attempts to keep her par-
ents from learning of her pregnancy. Thus, in several cases involving
guardians, the court further encumbered the already slow process of
seeking a waiver through additional delays. In addition, the obvious is
180 See supra Part ILA, I.C.
181 For example, one of the parties interviewed indicated that, even in the shorter hear-
ings, the guardian is prepared with a list of 70 questions, only about half of which are covered
by the minor's attorney. Interview notes supra note 48.
182 The Alabama Supreme Court recently noted that the typical non-adversarial character
of waiver hearings is altered by the presence of fetal representation. See Ex parte Anonymous,
No. 1001856, 2001 Ala. LEXIS 295 (Ala. July 30, 2001). Describing a waiver hearing that
included "probing cross-examination," Id. at *8, the court commented that "this was not a
'non-adversarial' proceeding." Id. at *12.
183 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 102 and 104 and accompanying text.
185 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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probably worth stating-delaying an abortion has potential medical con-
sequences that are not inconsiderable.
With the participation of guardians, the questions posed at hearings
have taken on a very different character. Owing to the fact that guardi-
ans are obligated to advance the interest of the fetus, the questions they
put to the minor are in some instances normative, designed to compel her
to consider the nature of human life, personhood, and killing. For exam-
ple, minors have been asked whether they believe abortion is wrong, and,
if so, why they would choose abortion over other alternatives. One mi-
nor who already had a child was asked whether she could imagine killing
that child and, upon saying no, was asked to explain how she could jus-
tify aborting the fetus.' 86 Consider also the following description of
guardianship participation offered by the Alabama Supreme Court:
[The minor] was cross-examined by a lawyer appointed
to represent the fetus, and she adhered to her testimony
and to her position that an abortion was the most appro-
priate course of action for her, despite being given full
exposure, through an extended cross-examination, to op-
posing viewpoints that strongly emphasized the negative
effect of the abortion procedure and that advocated the
benefits of having the child. 87
Thus, inquiry as to the first prong of the waiver proceeding does not
end with determining whether the minor is mature or with whether she is
capable of giving informed consent to a medical procedure. Rather, the
inquiry seeks to determine whether she comprehends the "philosophic
and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor
of continuing the pregnancy to full term."' 88
Finally, in light of the above changes, the anxiety produced by a
typical waiver hearing is, no doubt, intensified by the presence of a
guardian. The participation of a guardian who speaks on behalf of the
fetus is likely to make the minor more apprehensive. It is also true that
the adversarial character generated by the presence of a guardian is likely
to increase tension and conflict-as it certainly did when Julian McPhil-
lips took on the role of guardian.
These are among the things we know about the effects of appointing
guardians to represent the fetus. But there is much we do not know. We
do not know whether other pregnant minors have heard about these ap-
pointments and the resulting proceedings. We do not know whether mi-
nors have been dissuaded from pursuing waiver requests upon learning
186 Interview notes supra note 48.
187 Ex parte Anonymous, No. 1001856 at *12-13 (Ala. 2001).
188 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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that hearings in front of some judges have lasted as long as four hours
and may include questioning by a representative of the fetus. We do not
know whether minors, confronted by such questioning and by the testi-
mony of witnesses, feel pressured to change their minds about abortion.
While the full impact of guardianship appointments on pregnant mi-
nors remains unclear, we can conclude that what is already a challenging
process becomes more challenging when the court adds a guardian ad
litem. But do the added challenges constitute a "substantial obstacle?"
Again, in an ordinary sense of "substantial obstacle," the answer is yes.
Like the proverbial straw that breaks the camel's back, the addition of a
guardian places one more obstacle on top of another, thereby making the
hurdle the minor confronts more difficult to overcome. As the New
Jersey Supreme Court wrote in overturning its state's parental notifica-
tion law, "[Aidditional impediments added to existing impediments may
well prevent the exercise of a fundamental right altogether."' 18 9
Nevertheless, under the authority of Casey the added challenges do
not unduly burden minors. First, hearings involving the use of guardians
are not invalid merely because they last longer than the typical waiver
hearing. Few hearings last more than two hours, and even those delays
might withstand constitutional scrutiny given the Court's acceptance of
24-hour waiting periods. 190 With respect to what are now more routine
hearings-hearings that usually last less than 90 minutes-the additional
time is inconsequential under Casey.19 1
Second, while waiver hearings have become increasingly adver-
sarial with the involvement of guardians, this does not necessarily consti-
tute an unacceptable barrier to abortion. McPhillips may have gone too
far in his interrogation, thereby posing an undue burden on that particular
minor. Still, Casey does not preclude adversarial waiver hearings. To
the contrary, because Casey permits the state to make women aware that
there are strong arguments in favor of childbirth and against abortion,
189 Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, 165 N.J. 609, 638 (N.J. 2000) (holding that, despite the
inclusion of a judicial bypass option, New Jersey's parental notification statute violates the
equal protection provision of the New Jersey State Constitution).
190 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. In addition to upholding a state mandated
24-hour waiting period for adult women seeking abortions, the Court has upheld a Minnesota
statute prohibiting the performance of an abortion on a minor until at least 48 hours after
parental notification of the abortion. Indeed, the Court validated that waiting period notwith-
standing its acknowledgement that "the District Court found that scheduling factors, weather,
and the minor's school and work commitments may combine, in many cases, to create a delay
of a week or longer between the initiation of notification and the abortion .... See Hodgson,
497 U.S. at 449 (citation omitted).
191 505 U.S. 833. The additional time is inconsequential only if guardians do not have the
right to appeal grants of waiver petitions, as is currently the case in Alabama. Because the
right to appeal a grant of a waiver forces the minor to further delay abortion, the minor's health
is put at greater risk by allowing such appeals. However, guardianship appointments need not
be accompanied by a right to appeal.
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and because guardians work toward this end, the adversarialness they
create appears to be acceptable.
Third, and maybe most important, there is little indication that the
presence of fetal representation prevents minors from obtaining abor-
tions. The appointment of a guardian for the fetus would create a "sub-
stantial obstacle" if a significant number of minors were "deterred from
securing an abortion as surely as if the [state] had outlawed abortion in
all cases." 192 But unlike the case of spousal notification, evidence does
not, at this point, demonstrate that guardian appointments have deterred
minors from pursuing waiver requests in Montgomery County. In fact,
even with the presence of guardians, minors have successfully petitioned
for waivers of consent, and there is no reliable evidence to suggest that
minors forgo abortions because of guardians.
In response to the above, it might be argued that the orders of Mont-
gomery County judges requiring cooling-off periods and pro-life coun-
seling are constitutional violations. It might also be argued that the
religious overtones of these waiver hearings are constitutionally suspect.
When direct questioning related to Bible scripture comes into play, so
too do First Amendment considerations. Similarly suspect are questions
like the following one posed by a guardian to a minor in a recent hearing:
"If you did have a complication and you had to go to the hospital, your
church congregation is going to find out what's happened. How is that
going to effect [sic] your going to church every Sunday?" 193
These arguments are persuasive but beside the point. Mandated
pro-life counseling, cooling-off periods that impose additional delays,
and religious questioning raise serious constitutional issues. However,
the occurrence of such events during waiver hearings involving guardi-
ans does not demonstrate the constitutional impermissibility of the
guardianship appointments themselves. Though generated out of pro-
ceedings in which guardians have been present, it is the orders and the
religious questions themselves, not the guardians, that may violate the
constitution. These events are not necessarily connected to the presence
of guardians at waiver hearings. It is easy to imagine hearings at which
guardians are present and no such alleged violations occur. Moreover,
we need not employ our imagination to find cases in which such alleged
violations occur in the absence of guardianship appointments. In fact,
some judges in Birmingham, Alabama, ask religiously-laden questions
during waiver hearings despite the absence of guardians. 194 Therefore,
while it is possible for any judge to conduct a waiver hearing in such a
192 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
193 In re Anonymous, No. 2001026, 2001 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 347, at *5 (Ala. Civ.
App. July 18, 2001) (Yates, J., dissenting).
194 Interview notes supra note 48.
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way as to violate the constitution, and possible for guardians to pose
constitutionally inappropriate questions, it cannot be said, in light of
Casey, that the mere appointment of a guardian to represent the fetus has
the effect of imposing a "substantial obstacle" between a minor and her
right to an abortion.
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF CASEY
With Casey replacing Roe as the law of the land, it should not be
surprising that states may well find constitutional support when requiring
fetal representation to persuade young women to carry their pregnancies
to term. Moreover, if the presence of guardians in waiver hearings is
constitutional, we should not be surprised to see future regulations that
require adult women to meet with a designated representative of the fetus
prior to obtaining an abortion.195 An interest in protecting potential life
that justifies encouraging childbirth over abortion would, it seems, also
justify a requirement that adult women meet with a representative of the
fetus. As long as there is a time limit on such a meeting and women
remain free to choose abortion over childbirth after the meeting, such a
regulation is arguably consistent with Casey.196 What measure would
better serve the goal of "ensuring that a woman's choice contemplates
the consequences for the fetus"?. 97
Requiring an adult woman to discuss her abortion decision with a
guardian who speaks for the fetus is a chilling prospect, one that should
be seen as striking at the heart of liberty. As Justice Stevens rightly
notes,
Serious questions arise, however, when a State attempts
to "persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abor-
tion." Decisional autonomy must limit the State's power
to inject into a woman's most personal deliberations its
own views of what is best. The State may promote its
preferences by funding childbirth, by creating and main-
taining alternatives to abortion, and by espousing the vir-
195 Such a measure could be incorporated into the informed consent provisions that states
have adopted.
196 If the measure gave guardians or a third party the authority to stop women from hav-
ing abortions, it would violate Casey. But imagine a measure that provides guardians with the
opportunity to "inform" the women of the nature of potential life and that includes time restric-
tions and safeguards for women's confidentiality. The fact that women would be required to
meet with guardians would not, by itself, prevent abortions. Nor would such a measure be
likely to deter women from pursuing an abortion. Therefore, a provision requiring pregnant
women to meet with an appointed guardian for the fetus would impose some added costs, but
not so much as to amount to a substantial obstacle.
197 Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 (joint opinion).
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tues of family; but it must respect the individual's
freedom to make such judgments.198
Requiring an adult woman to meet with an agent for the fetus would
inject the state's preferences into a woman's personal decisions. While
this might appear to be a more egregious interference with liberty than
requiring guardianship appointments in waiver hearings, it is not. Like
an adult woman, the mature and well-informed minor finds her freedom
to make judgments about abortion, childbirth and family invaded when
forced to confront fetal representation. Unlike the adult woman, a minor
who faces a guardian knows that her future rests not in her own hands
but on the outcome of the waiver hearing. The fact that the minor is,
after all, a minor and not an adult does not make guardianship appoint-
ments less intrusive. Since waiver hearings are designed, in the first in-
stance, to determine the minor's level of maturity and the extent to which
she is informed about abortion and its alternatives, the introduction of
representation for the fetus before that determination is made cannot be
defended on the grounds that the minor may not be mature and well-
informed.
Therefore, if the prospect of compelling an adult woman to have a
conversation with a guardian for the fetus appears problematic, the cur-
rent reality for minors who seek abortions in Montgomery, Alabama,
should appear all the worse. Whether in Alabama or elsewhere, guardian-
ship appointments are appropriately seen as constitutive of a state's "ef-
forts to prejudice a woman's choice . . . by requir[ing] the delivery of
information designed to influence the woman's informed choice between
abortion or childbirth."' 99 With these appointments and their attendant
impediments, "the power of the State reach[es] into the heart of the lib-
erty protected by the Due Process Clause," 2°° thereby interposing a
state's views about abortion into an individual's most intimate decisions.
Even in the best case scenario, where hearings last less than an hour,
where guardians call no additional witnesses and avoid intimidating tac-
tics, where religious questions are disallowed, and where guardians are
denied the right to appeal the grant of a waiver petition, the participation
of an agent for the fetus is troubling. Because the designation of fetal
representation is a moral regulation that advances a particular view of
human life and personhood, minors who confront guardians must contest
that view. This is a formidable task for anyone, let alone an anxious
pregnant teenager who must make her case in a courthouse, with all its
198 Casey, 505 U.S. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Casey joint opinion, 505 U.S. at 878) (citation omitted).
199 Id. at 917 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original).
200 Id. at 874 (joint opinion).
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symbols of authority and power, under the direct questioning of a trained
lawyer and under the scrutiny of a judge.
The imposition of this formidable task is made possible by the per-
missive character of the undue burden standard. Furthermore, that the
imposition of this task would be sustainable under the undue burden
standard reveals serious shortcomings in Casey. If states may, consistent
with the undue burden test, require that a woman-minor or adult-be
questioned by an agent of the fetus, then there is something fundamen-
tally wrong with that test.
In particular, Casey's elaboration of the undue burden standard
fails-as Justice Scalia has argued 2 0-to intelligibly distinguish be-
tween encouraging childbirth and hindering abortion. Still, Casey relies
on the purported distinction and, in so doing, permits slippage between
what it means to encourage childbirth and what it means to hinder abor-
tion. This slippage empowers states to, under the guise of advocating
childbirth, place substantial obstacles in the path to abortion, precisely
what the Casey ruling purports to forbid. Indeed, Casey invites states to
devise, for the sake of the fetus, whatever obstacle course they wish wo-
men to maneuver through, as long as the obstacles, however high and
onerous, are capable of being hurdled and do not impose serious health
or safety hazards.
Absent an intelligible distinction between encouraging childbirth
and hindering abortion, the notion of "substantial obstacle" becomes a
euphemism for those regulations that prevent abortion or pose substantial
health risks for women. If this is the Court's definition of "substantial
obstacle," then the right to abortion has been considerably stripped of its
power to protect the individual from state intrusion. For if having a
right-whether to abortion or something else-means that the state may,
short of preventing the exercise of the right, regulate that right as it sees
fit, then rights are no longer what they once seemed. 20 2
Acknowledging this shortcoming in Casey is not new. As noted
earlier, Justice Scalia criticized the joint opinion in Casey for its failure
to differentiate between efforts to encourage childbirth and efforts to hin-
der abortion. However, the case of guardianship appointments in waiver
hearings illuminates the consequences of this shortcoming, providing a
salient example of Casey's inadequacy.
201 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
202 Justice Scalia expresses a similar concern in his dissenting opinion in Casey. Al-
though not concerned with restrictions on abortion-Scalia argues that abortion is not a consti-
tutionally protected right-he does express strong reservations that the creation of the undue
burden test places "all constitutional rights at risk." Casey, 505 U.S. at 988 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION
Roe sought "to ensure that the woman's right to choose not become
so subordinate to the State's interest in promoting fetal life that her
choice exists in theory but not in fact."20 3 It would be an exaggeration to
say that the "undue burden" standard has taken us to a point where the
choice of abortion is only a theoretical one. However, it is neither exag-
geration nor hyperbole to say that a woman's right to choose abortion
free from state pressure is no longer protected by the Constitution, as it
was in Roe. This is indeed true because, owing to Casey, a woman's
right to choose abortion free from state pressure has been subordinated to
the State's interest in promoting fetal life.
Subordinating a woman's right to choose abortion to the State's in-
terests in promoting fetal life justifies the appointment of guardians ad
litem to represent the unborn at waiver of parental consent hearings.
This is why guardianship appointments are likely to be validated under
the "undue burden" standard, despite their onerous quality. And this is
why we should conclude that "the undue burden test itself is undue. '20 4
203 Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 (joint opinion).
204 Robin L. West, The Nature of the Right to an Abortion: A Commentary on Professor
Brownstein's Analysis of Casey, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 961, 967 (1994). West draws this conclu-
sion for different reasons, finding that
until the societal demand that the woman's right to choose be exercised justly and
responsibly is circumscribed by a requirement that society itself be minimally just-
the imposition by the state of a requirement that the woman make the decision to
abort justly (which is what Casey's undue burden test at heart is) constitutes, itself,
an arrogant act of injustice.
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